The semantic objection which Maitzen presents is not unique, he admits. Maitzen approvingly quotes John Chandler as getting to the heart of the matter:
If God's will is the only standard of goodness and rightness, the statement 'God is good' reduces to the triviality that what God wills is always in conformity with what God wills, which is true whatever he wills. Consequently, it will not be possible to distinguish God from an omnipotent but evil being, or show that he is worthy of worship. Only if there is a criterion of rightness and goodness independent of God does 'God is good' become a significant, non-trivial claim . . . . [T]he central Christian doctrine of God's goodness cannot be significantly asserted
by a subscriber to [DCM].[1]
Chandler doesn't spell out his reasoning as throroughly as we might hope, which is the task Maitzen is attempting in this paper.
Firstly, Maitzen attempts to work out just what a Divine Command Metaethic consists of. He finds that DCM proponents, such as Adams, have claimed that DCM does not concern the meaning of ethical terms, just their truth conditions, while others claim both (R.M. Adams originally accepted both, but subsequently retreated to simply supporting the claim that DCM supports the truth conditions of ethical terms). Maitzen gives some reasons to think that a DCM must concern meaning, and not just truth conditions. To do so he presents 4 sentences
- (S1) 'God exists.'
- (S2) 'God is omniscient.'
- (S3) 'God is omnipotent.'
- (S4) 'God is morally good.'
A DCM which only gives truth conditions tells us nothing about S4, an ethical sentence, that is not true of the sentences. Worse, according to Maitzen, some entirely non-metaethical theory would tell us all that DCM tells us about that ethical sentence. This makes it difficult to understand just how such a DCM would be a metaethical theory. Maitzen assumes here that the truth and meaning of such sentences differ (or at least, can differ).
Maitzen then argues that no tautology is religiously significant:
" The crucial premise of that reasoning is this: no tautology is religiously significant, even though, contrary to Rachels, all tautologies, all 'empty truisms,' are cognitively significant. In particular, no tautology can contribute to making it the case that, or provide good reasons for thinking that, God is worthy of worship. But, according to traditional theism, the doctrine of God's moral goodness does contribute to making it the case that, does provide good reasons for thinking that, God deserves worship. So no metaethics is compatible with traditional theism if it reduces the doctrine of God's moral goodness to a tautology."
After establishing these claims, that a DCM must concern the truth and meaning of ethical terms, and that no tautology can have religious significance, Maitzen presents his argument:
- According to no metaethics compatible with traditional theism is the sentence 'God is (morally) good' religiously trivial.
- Every tautology is religiously trivial; no tautology is religiously significant.
- If two sentences have the same meaning, then one of them is a tautology only if both are.
- According to DCM, for any agent x, 'x is (morally) good' has the same meaning as 'x wills what God wills.'
- Therefore: According to DCM, 'God is (morally) good' has the same meaning as 'God wills what God wills.' [From (4)]
- 'God wills what God wills' is a tautology.
- Therefore: According to DCM, 'God is (morally) good' is a tautology. [From (3), (5), (6)][see footnote 2]
- Therefore: According to DCM, 'God is (morally) good' is religiously trivial. [From (2), (7)]
- Therefore: DCM is incompatible with traditional theism. [From (1), (8)]
- Therefore: If traditional theism is true, then DCM is false. [From (9)]
- If moral nihilism is false and DCM is true, then traditional theism is true.
- Therefore: If traditional theism is false, then moral nihilism is true or DCM is false. [From (11)]
- Therefore: If traditional theism is false, then DCM is true only if moral nihilism is true. [From (12)]
- Traditional theism is true, or traditional theism is false.
- Therefore: DCM is true only if moral nihilism is true. [From (10), (13), (14)]
The argument looks to be deductively valid, and Maitzen further argues that the premises are sound.
Step 10 is of interest to theists, as it shows that DCM is incompatible with traditional theism. The further steps show that DCM can only be true if moral nihilism is true ("either DCM is false,or else there are no instantiated moral properties, and no moral truths, to which DCM can even apply.")
It seems to be an interesting argument, and if sound would seem to be disastrous to proponents of Divine Command ethics.
Unfortunately I've been unable to find much in the way of commentary or criticism of this paper online. Some further discussion of the paper can be found here
[1] 'Is the Divine Command Theory Defensible?' Religious Studies 20 (1984):
443-452; 446.
[2] The text of the paper states that step 7 follows from 3, 4, & 5. Accoding to Maitzen, this is a mistake, and 3,5,6 is correct
